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Abstract
Following the Great Recession, employment in the local education sector fell by about 364,000.
This paper seeks to capture any effect of states’ teacher layoff legislation on public high school
graduation rates. I analyze whether state legislation that prohibits or limits the use of seniority
in layoff decisions has an impact on graduation rates. I find that, all else held constant, such
legislation increases the yearly growth of district graduation rates by 0.2 percentage points
on average. This is economically significant, as the average yearly increase in the national
graduation rate from 2010-11 to 2015-16 was 1 percentage point. When states prohibit or limit
using seniority to determine a layoff order, districts must utilize other considerations such as
teacher quality. In states with such legislation, teachers remaining following layoffs are likely
more effective as opposed to ones in states that used seniority to determine the layoff order.
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Highlights:
• Following Great Recession, school districts faced massive teacher layoffs.
• Many states passed legislation restricting the use of seniority in teacher layoffs.
• Such legislation may lead to a higher yearly gain in high school graduation rates.
• Results show increases of 0.16 to 0.23 percentage point increases in yearly gains.
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1. Introduction
With two notable exceptions, the school-year average in the local government education sector has
consistently added jobs since 1955, when the measure was first tracked. The first of such exceptions
took place during and following the 1980s recession. The sector lost approximately 140,000 jobs,
about 2 percent of the workforce, between February 1981 and October 1983. Employment levels
recovered within a year. Then, during and following the Great Recession, the sector lost 364,000
jobs between July 2008 and November 2012–more than double the 1980s loss and 4 percent of the
workforce. As of May 2018, only 185,000 jobs have been added back since the 2012 low.1
The Great Recession caused a significant and lasting effect on state budgets, constricting the
flow of state funding to public school districts. In regions particularly impacted by the recession,
many families were forced to relocate, thus contributing to substantially lower enrollment levels
and further exacerbating funding problems. School districts across the United States saw the need
to lay off substantial numbers of personnel, including teachers, in order to address financial and
enrollment problems. However, perhaps in part due to the relatively short history of teacher layoffs,
many states and school districts were ill prepared to determine which teachers would be subject to
termination.
The focus of this paper, is how policies regarding teacher layoff order affects students. Different
policies affect the quality distribution of teachers, and higher-quality teachers contribute to im-
proved student outcomes (Goldhaber and Theobald, 2010; Chetty et al., 2014). As several states
since 2009 have enacted legislation prohibiting or restricting the use of seniority in teacher layoff
decisions, I seek to capture the effect of layoff legislation on public high school graduation rates.
My hypothesis is that legislation prohibiting or restricting the use of seniority as a predominant
factor in determining the layoff order of teaching positions has a positive impact on graduation
rates.
I find that the enactment of such legislation on average increases the yearly growth of district
graduation rates by about 0.2 percentage points, all else held constant. This finding is statistically
significant at less than the 0.01 level. It is also economically significant, as the average yearly
increase in the national graduation rate for public high school students from 2010-11 to 2015-
1Using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data on local government education sector employment.
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16 was about 1 percentage point. If the yearly growth of overall U.S. graduation rates were 0.2
percentage points higher, it would have resulted in an additional 115,808 graduates between 2011-
12 and 2015-16. Also, the estimate of 0.2 is within range of what Bekkerman and Gilpin (2011)
find from a $1,000 investment in either improving teacher quality via offering higher wages (0.2 to
1.1 percentage point increase in the graduation rate).
The graduation rate increase due to restrictions on using seniority in layoff decisions would
also generally increase the social welfare, as high school graduates have better access to jobs with
higher wages and postsecondary education. These results suggest that, absent using seniority to
determine a layoff order, considerations such as teacher quality may play a larger role. The teachers
remaining following layoffs not based on seniority may be more effective and therefore their schools
would experience higher graduation rates, as opposed to schools that used seniority to determine
the layoff order.
This paper proceeds to discuss the recent background on teacher layoffs in Section 2. In Section
3, I present the conceptual framework for analyzing the impact of state policy on student outcomes.
The data is described in Section 4. Following in Section 5 are results, and in Section 6 are robustness
checks. Section 7 concludes and proposes other considerations particular to the analysis in this
paper, as well as general concerns regarding using teacher effectiveness measures, as presented in
current literature.
2. Background
Prior to 2009, the majority of state legislation did not mandate the manner in which school districts
could determine personnel subject to dismissal in the event of a layoff, permitting districts to decide.
For states that did, the legislation usually specified that school districts must lay off in the order
of reverse seniority (perhaps even irrespective of any other considerations such as high-demand
certification areas,2 or whether schools serving higher poverty populations would be more severely
affected).
Then this issue gained national attention as state legislators were considering and passing laws
aimed at reducing the effect of seniority. Some states merely specified factors to be considered before
2Districts required to layoff by seniority without considering high-demand certification areas would then need to
recall such teachers to fill these areas. This inefficient process would require the number of staff subject to layoff to be
unnecessarily larger, as the district would knowingly be laying off staff that would immediately need to be recalled.
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seniority (such as performance or certification area); some required multiple factors to be considered
simultaneously; and others prohibited the use of seniority at all. While all such legislation activity
has aimed to weaken seniority protections, not all proposed bills have passed. In many states, it
remains a debated, unresolved issue. Certainly, no broad consensus has been reached to address
exactly how to determine staff subject to layoff.
There are two likely forces for this focus on layoff procedures: the push for retention of quality
teachers and the Great Recession after which districts laid off substantial numbers of teachers.
The focus on quality teachers, as measured by student performance or other metrics aside from
seniority, was at least in part due to the priorities of the Obama administration. New federal grants
were awarded to states on the basis of their efforts to define teacher performance in part on student
outcomes and utilize the information for staffing decisions. This created an incentive for states to
maintain or change legislation to match the grants’ priorities. Simultaneously, states nationwide
were dealing with constricted budgets following the recession, narrowing state funding flowing to
districts. Other federal funding stimulus grants to school districts were often insufficient to fully
compensate for the drop in state funding. For the first time it seemed to matter what the policy on
layoffs was: states and districts were experiencing a need to layoff teachers, necessitating a formal
stance on how to identify teachers affected.
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics began tracking teacher employment in 2010. Between
2010 and 2017, 273,000 elementary, middle, and secondary teacher jobs were added (see Figure 1).
However, secondary teaching positions alone dropped by 182,000. Combined with the overall local
education sector layoffs and reduced employment levels continuing well beyond the recession years,
there is evidence for national teacher layoffs occurring at significant levels even through 2017. In
particular, layoffs are occurring even after state policy changes came into effect (as early as 2009-10
and as late as 2015-16).
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Fig. 1. Teacher employment.
Source: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey, “Employment of elementary and middle school teachers” and “Employ-
ment of secondary school teachers.”
Supporters of prohibiting or limiting the use of seniority in layoff decisions argue that higher-
quality teachers should not be laid off before lower-quality teachers just because they have fewer
years of service to the district. The main assumption here, as Chetty et al. (2014) find, is that
higher-quality teachers have higher average impacts on students’ test scores and future labor market
outcomes. A second important assumption is that the quality distribution of teachers remaining
is in fact different under two alternate policies favoring or limiting seniority as the deciding factor.
This assumption is supported by research on Washington state school district layoffs in 2008 to
2010 from Goldhaber and Theobald (2010), who find little overlap in the teachers remaining using
a simulation of layoff by value-added measures (VAM), a measurement of teachers’ contributions
to their students’ performance, versus by seniority. Using student achievement to quantify teacher
quality, they find that the mean quality of teacher actually laid off (by seniority) was 5-6% of
a standard deviation lower than that of all teachers. This supports the claim by advocates of
seniority protection that experience can contribute to higher-quality teachers. However, under
simulation, if the layoff had been done by effectiveness measures, the mean quality of teacher laid
off would have been 24-26% of a standard deviation lower than that of all teachers. Therefore, the
distribution of teacher quality, as defined by effectiveness or ability to positively impact student
outcomes, is expected to be different under the two layoff policies. In addition, teacher quality
was significantly higher when effectiveness measures were used than when only seniority was used.
My results suggest that the distribution of quality teachers is not just immediately or temporarily
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altered by such policies, but also that restricting seniority consideration persistently and positively
affects student graduation rates.
One argument against limiting seniority protections involves school districts’ financial concerns.
School districts implement layoffs as part of a response to declining enrollment and/or major
financial problems. Therefore, it is natural for teachers and advocates to fight for protections
against a district simply laying off its most expensive (and likely most senior) personnel. All else
equal, it would be in the district’s best interest to terminate a higher-cost contract even if they
needed to rehire for that position, at which point they could hire a new, minimal-cost teacher.
In addition, the impact of turnover would be lower since fewer positions would have to be closed
in order to achieve the cost reduction. Advocates of seniority protections also argue that more
experienced teachers are better, and perhaps any routine evaluation system should be sufficient
to remove truly unsatisfactory employees. Yet findings from Goldhaber and Theobald (2010), as
previously discussed, suggest otherwise.
3. Empirical Framework
3.1 Statistical Model
I analyze the effect of state policy on district graduation rates for the ten-year time period 2006-07
to 2015-16, controlling for related district attributes. The regression equation is as follows:
∆gdt = α+ γpst + βXdt + εdt (1)
where:
• ∆gdt is the change in graduation rate for district d from prior school year t− 1 to year t
• α represents the fixed growth of the graduation rate from one school year to the next
• γ represents the fixed effect of policy on the graduation rate
• pst indicates state s policy on the role of seniority in teacher layoffs, in effect for year t, where:
pst =
1 if use of seniority is restricted by state s in year t0 otherwise
• βXdt is the control vector for attributes of district d in year t
• εdt is the effect of unobserved variables
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Here, policy is defined as implemented if the influence of seniority on layoff order is prohibited
or restricted, and not implemented otherwise.
The control vector contains the district-level measure of financial stability (surplus per 1,000
students), percentage of children ages 5-17 in poverty, percentage of students receiving special
education services, percentage of students who are English language learners, membership, and
graduation cohort size. Also included are urbanicity and geographic region indicator variables.
The parameter of interest is γ, the estimated effect of policy pst. I hypothesize that the policy
has a positive effect on the graduation rate and so expect a positive value for γ, the coefficient on
policy. In the absence of seniority as the primary factor, subjective factors such as the quality of
the teacher are used. As Chetty et al. (2014) and Goldhaber and Theobald (2010) suggest that
considering teacher quality would lead to a higher-quality distribution of teachers and therefore
improved student outcomes, I expect that the effect of the policy on teacher quality distribution is
long-lasting and significant enough to have a persistent effect on the graduation rate.
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the model.
Notes: The solid line illustrates a constant percentage point increase (α) in the graduation
rate each year as a baseline for states that do not restrict using seniority in layoff decisions.
The dotted line illustrates a steeper slope (α+ γ), assuming a γ-percentage point increase
in the growth of the graduation rate in a state implementing restrictions on using seniority
beginning with (for example) the 2011-12 school year.
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3.2 Unbiasedness and Model Assumptions
In order to argue that the estimated effect of the policy is unbiased, I must control for any variables
that correlate with the outcome (graduation rate) and the variable of interest (policy). There are
some variables that impact both the graduation rate of districts within a state and whether the
state enacted laws limiting the impact of seniority. The motivation for states to pass legislation was
derived from two events impacting all states: the Great Recession, and the Obama administration
initiatives concerned with teacher quality. Both events affected the funding available to school
districts, but likely affected them differently based upon the prior financial health of the district
and its state.
A district already financially-strained may also have a lower graduation rate. Therefore, it
is necessary to consider a measure of general financial health within the control vector. I use
the district surplus (total revenue less total expenditures) per 1,000 students as the indicator for
financial health. However, as financial information is only available through 2013-14, all regressions
including this variable cover a shorter eight-year period instead (see Table 4).
In addition, the district distributions of student poverty, special education needs, and English
language learners (ELL) may significantly affect district resources. All may require additional
district assistance beyond strictly academic services. As a proxy for student poverty, I use the U.S.
Census Bureau’s estimated percentage of children ages 5-17 in poverty within the boundaries of
each district. I use student membership totals to convert special education and ELL variables to
percentages of the district population.
Lastly, I consider district student membership totals and the size of their graduating cohort,
as well as indicator variables for urbanicity and geographic region. These can help control for
some unobserved fixed effects. The sensitivity of school district finances and graduation rates may
vary by district size, population density and region. For example, a large urban district may have
connections to more private funding sources. Graduation rates are observed to roughly vary by
region, and I group states into one of four regions according to the U.S. Census Bureau’s definition.
I was unable to use the Census Bureau’s more refined state grouping (division); it is too refined for
this analysis since for some divisions it correlates perfectly with the policy variable.
One notable omission in the control vector is the political leaning or influence for each state.
Restricting Seniority as a Factor in Teacher Layoffs 9
Historically, more democratic politicians support unions, and unions tend to oppose restrictions on
seniority protections. Therefore, one would expect a policy reducing the consideration of seniority
in layoff decisions to be proposed and passed in states with more republican control. However, that
does not appear to be the case with the observed policy implementation.
Some states that passed this legislation, such as Florida and Georgia, did have house and
senate republican majorities and a republican governor. Florida’s was passed without any democrat
support. However, one of the early Georgia supporters was a democrat (who had even introduced
a similar though unsuccessful house bill prior to the senate bill that was enacted). There are also
cases of states under democrat control passing legislation restricting seniority use in teacher layoffs.
Illinois and Colorado had democrat governors and majorities in both houses when they passed such
legislation. Illinois passed their law with nearly unanimously. In New Jersey, a democrat introduced
a bill in 2012 to remove its last-in-first-out law (among other changes), but amendments prior to
its passage left LIFO intact. At the time, New Jersey had democrat control in legislature and a
republican governor. Pennsylvania is another interesting case, whereby under republican control
of both houses and the governorship 2011 to 2015, no legislation attempts were successful. Then
the republican-controlled legislature finally approved a bill in 2016 to remove its LIFO law but the
new governor, a democrat, vetoed it. Then the legislature repeated the process again in 2017, and
the same governor allowed it to become a law via inaction.
These cases are not an exhaustive list of the activity and political composition of states over
time, but illustrates that political control is not necessarily indicative of whether the state takes
action to restrict seniority in teacher layoffs. Therefore, it is not included in the control vector. A
future extension could explicitly analyze this factor, but for this paper I am assuming that it does
not have a significant impact.
4. Data
4.1 Graduation Rates
The outcome variable is the graduation rate measured from 0 to 100, the number of graduates per
100 students who graduate. Graduation data is from the US Department of Education’s National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The graduation data for school years 2006-07 to 2009-10
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are calculated differently than for years 2010-11 to 2015-16. During the first set of school years, the
NCES did not regulate the methodology for calculating a graduation rate. Since 2010-11, NCES
regulates this calculation but there still may be measurement differences despite using a uniform
definition of cohort or degree type. Data reported in each set is insufficient to generate graduation
rates that can be compared between the two sets. In order to address this problem, all analysis
performed excludes the change in graduation rates between the two years in which the formula was
also changed (2009-10 to 2010-11).
As suggested by Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) and Murnane (2013), these particular sets of
graduation data can each be unreliable for analysis. They argue that the calculation of graduation
rates do not ensure uniform treatment of problems with student accounting and variation in degree
types. It is difficult to assign a definition of the cohort basis, without introducing potential for
error, to compare to the number of graduates. (For example, NCES makes adjustments to account
for eighth-grade dropouts or net student migration immediately prior to ninth grade, but would
still be imperfect.) Also, it is difficult to account for varying degree types offered by each school
district (GEDs, diplomas, or other options).
I hope to mitigate concerns with this data, as my analysis does not attempt to compare any
absolute graduation rates with one another. I only utilize the difference in a district’s graduation
rate from one year to the next. As long as district reporting is internally consistent, concerns
Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) and Murnane (2013) raised should not affect these results.
4.2 Policy Indicator
The policy variable is generated from research on each state’s legislative history.3 Policy takes
on one of two values for each district and school year combination: state-mandated prohibited or
restricted use of seniority in determining layoff orders (indicator equals 1), or otherwise (indicator
equals 0). The parameter on the policy variable therefore measures the impact of state legislation
that prohibits or restricts the consideration of seniority for school district layoffs.
Where state legislation has specified the role of seniority, it does not vary across its districts.
Where no explicit policy is in place (or the state explicitly permits district flexibility), practices
3The National Center on Teacher Quality (NCTQ) also produces a State Policy Yearbook Database every two
years beginning with 2011, which was very helpful in guiding my research.
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may vary from district to district. When school districts are permitted discretion, they may vary in
the degree to which they consider seniority. In analyzing a North Carolina district implementing a
large layoff, Kraft (2015) found that, while no VAM model was explicitly used, there was significant
emphasis on teacher attributes (such as principal evaluations) in the determination of layoff order.
However, districts as a whole may or may not adopt strong seniority considerations when given the
discretion.
Texas and Missouri are the only states observed to have the policy of limiting seniority for the
entire time period covered in the data set. Texas in particular represents nearly ten percent of the
observations in this compiled data set of public school districts. In the latter years of the data set,
it also displays hardly any increase in graduation rates (see Fig. 3). Its average graduation rate
is already over 90% by 2011-12, so additional yearly increases would be more difficult to achieve.
Since including Texas would drive and bias the regression, I omit it in all analyses unless otherwise
specified.
4.3 Control Variables
Figures for each district’s total expenditure and total revenue, number of students receiving special
education services, number of English language learners, urbanicity indicator, student membership,
and graduating cohort size are all obtained from the U.S. National Center from Education Statistics
(NCES). The percentage of children in poverty per school district boundary is from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates. State groupings by region are aligned with
the U.S. Census Bureau’s definition.
4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Presented in Table 1 are descriptive statistics for graduation rates and the policy indicator variable,
organized by state.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of graduation rates, by state and policy.
State N Mean SD N Mean SD
Alabama 805 75.8 11.8
Alaska 36 70.1 12.9
Arizona 112 74.6 12.1 197 81.1 9.0
Arkansas 450 79.8 9.9
California 1000 88.0 9.9
Colorado 107 73.7 14.0 22 75.1 12.8
Connecticut 651 86.9 11.4
Delaware 151 78.9 13.2
D.C.
Florida 60 66.2 8.2 45 72.3 9.6
Georgia 567 66.8 10.0 292 81.1 9.0
Hawaii
Idaho 127 80.5 9.7 40 82.0 5.7
Illinois 550 85.6 10.4 629 87.1 7.6
Indiana 891 78.6 10.5 495 89.7 6.5
Iowa 501 89.5 8.1
Kansas 342 84.6 9.1
Kentucky 755 82.5 9.3
Louisiana 262 67.5 9.8 156 81.5 6.8
Maine 76 81.2 6.8 60 84.7 6.7
Maryland 136 87.4 6.6
Massachusetts 1137 85.1 11.0
Michigan 1415 81.3 12.9 905 80.4 14.2
Minnesota 927 85.5 10.0
Mississippi 718 67.9 11.7
Missouri 1008 86.3 9.7
Montana 54 85.1 3.9
Nebraska 218 87.4 8.6
Nevada 5 58.7 13.4 25 72.8 7.2
New Hampshire
New Jersey 1786 89.9 9.7
New Mexico 140 71.2 9.4
New York 2313 85.6 11.4
North Carolina 887 78.2 8.6
North Dakota 87 84.7 8.4
Ohio 1704 84.9 11.1 876 89.8 8.0
Oklahoma 381 80.5 9.2 131 83.8 7.2
Oregon 192 76.1 9.4
Pennsylvania 2648 87.9 9.0
Rhode Island 75 79.9 11.2 105 82.8 9.7
South Carolina 304 74.8 11.5
South Dakota 102 82.3 12.6
Tennessee 396 79.4 9.2 357 91.0 4.2
Texas
Utah 127 79.1 9.4 128 84.4 7.1
Vermont
Virginia 590 77.4 9.3 222 84.9 5.8
Washington 913 77.3 10.2 90 82.6 6.9
West Virginia 364 81.7 6.9
Wisconsin 316 94.0 6.1 203 94.0 3.9
Wyoming 100 79.7 8.0
25478 79.9 9.9 5986 83.4 7.9
Seniority not restricted
(Policy==0)
Seniority restricted
(Policy==1)
Graduation Rate Graduation Rate
Notes: States with policies restricting the use of seniority in teacher layoffs a particular
year are listed as “seniority restricted.” School years included are 2006-07 through 2015-16.
NCES does not provide graduation data under review or for very small districts. District-
level graduating cohort sizes of less than 100 are omitted, as are districts where the standard
deviation of graduation rate changes exceeds 30. Also, I excluded any districts that indicated
charter schools were included, since not all are required to follow these state mandates on
traditional public schools. Texas data is also omitted (see section 4.2 for explanation).
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The number of observations per school year is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Number of observations per year.
School Year Comparison Change in Graduation Rate
(Year Over Year)
No. of Observations
(School Districts)
2006-07 to 2007-08 0.41 4,538
2007-08 to 2008-09 0.52 4,441
2008-09 to 2009-10 1.22 4,372
2009-10 to 2010-11 - 0
2010-11 to 2011-12 1.14 2,605
2011-12 to 2012-13 1.15 2,655
2012-13 to 2013-14 0.90 2,604
2013-14 to 2014-15 0.92 2,555
2014-15 to 2015-16 0.62 2,470
Total 26,240
Notes: The significant decline in observations between 2009-10 and 2010-11 coincides with
the change in graduation rate calculation methodology. The decline is likely due to increased
privacy restrictions, whereby data for smaller schools is omitted from the latter sets.
Fig. 3(b) illustrates parallel trends prior to policy implementation. Fig. 3(a) shows that Texas,
already with high rates in latter years, grows little and could easily bias the regression downward
if included. Fig. 3(c) shows that, compared to states with no seniority restrictions, most groups of
states implementing restrictions experienced gains in graduation rates. Since the graduation rate
calculation changes between 2009-10 and 2010-11, trend lines in this time segment are omitted.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 3. Average graduation rate per group of states
Notes: Graduation rates are obtained from the U.S. National Center from Education Statistics. The
formula for calculating graduation rates was adjust between 2009-10 and 2010-11, so comparisons
in the changes in rates should not be made between those two years. Fig. 3(a) shows trendlines
for the group with no statewide seniority restrictions on layoff decisions, along with the two states
with state-mandated seniority restrictions during the entire time period under consideration. Fig.
3(b) shows trendlines for states enacting seniority restrictions in layoff decisions, only for the years
prior to implementation. Fig. 3(c) shows trendlines for states enacting seniority restrictions in
layoff decisions, beginning with the last year prior to implementation.
5. Results
First, I present results for 2006-07 to 2015-16, which do not account for district financial health.
Information on district-level finances at the time of writing is only available through 2013-14;
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Table 4 presents results on the shorter 8-year timeframe to include the financial surplus per 1,000
students. To account for heteroskedasticity, I cluster standard errors by school district. District-
level graduating cohort sizes of less than 100 are omitted, as are districts where the standard
deviation of graduation rate changes exceeds 30.4 Observations from Texas are omitted from all
models in this section.
Table 3: Coefficient Estimates for Graduation Rate Changes, 2006-07 to 2015-16
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Policy 0.0905 0.236∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗ 0.165∗∗
(0.0511) (0.0605) (0.0604) (0.0635) (0.0633)
% Special Education -2.102∗ -2.197∗
(0.928) (0.928)
% ELL 1.778∗∗ 1.406∗
(0.579) (0.594)
% Poverty 3.060∗∗∗ 3.174∗∗∗
(0.418) (0.420)
Constant 0.809∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗ 0.437 0.210
(0.0294) (0.187) (0.223) (0.227) (0.262)
Urbanicity Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Membership/Cohort Controls No No Yes No Yes
N 26240 26240 26191 24578 24578
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Policy is a variable that indicates whether a state has legislation prohibiting or restricting
the influence of seniority on teacher layoff order in effect in a given school year. I constructed this
variable using legislation information from each state. Linear and quadratic terms are included for
both student membership and graduating cohort size. Standard errors are clustered by district.
District-level graduating cohort sizes of less than 100 are omitted, as are districts where the standard
deviation of graduation rate changes exceeds 30. Texas is excluded (see section 6.2). The percentage
of children in poverty per school district boundary is from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area
Income and Poverty Estimates. State groupings by region are aligned with the U.S. Census Bureau’s
definition. All other figures are obtained from the U.S. National Center from Education Statistics.
Now, I include financial information, which then constricts the years under consideration to
4In districts with small cohorts, the graduation status of a single student can cause significant fluctuations in the
overall graduation rate. Districts with standard deviations greater than 30 appeared to clearly contain an error.
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2006-07 to 2013-14. Models (1)-(5) below correspond to those in Table 3 but are truncated to this
8-year window for comparison to model (6), which adds fiscal surplus per 1,000 students.
Table 4: Coefficient Estimates for Graduation Rate Changes, 2006-07 to 2013-14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy 0.128 0.299∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.225∗∗
(0.0670) (0.0772) (0.0770) (0.0828) (0.0826) (0.0827)
% Special Education -1.781 -1.862 -1.880
(1.090) (1.091) (1.092)
% ELL 1.680∗ 1.212 1.202
(0.765) (0.784) (0.783)
% Poverty 2.488∗∗∗ 2.675∗∗∗ 2.684∗∗∗
(0.511) (0.515) (0.516)
Surplus per 1,000 Students 0.0103
(0.0238)
Constant 0.821∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗ 0.726∗ 0.450 0.452
(0.0334) (0.227) (0.280) (0.289) (0.339) (0.339)
Urbanicity Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Membership/Cohort Controls No No Yes No Yes Yes
N 21215 21215 21205 19679 19679 19676
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Policy is a variable that indicates whether a state has legislation prohibiting or restricting
the influence of seniority on teacher layoff order in effect in a given school year. I constructed this
variable using legislation information from each state. Linear and quadratic terms are included for
both student membership and graduating cohort size. Standard errors are clustered by district.
District-level graduating cohort sizes of less than 100 are omitted, as are districts where the standard
deviation of graduation rate changes exceeds 30. Texas is excluded (see section 6.2). Surplus per
1,000 students is a fiscal measurement of district financial health, adjusted to real 2018 dollars using
the Consumer Price Index from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The percentage of children
in poverty per school district boundary is from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and
Poverty Estimates. State groupings by region are aligned with the U.S. Census Bureau’s definition.
All other figures are obtained from the U.S. National Center from Education Statistics.
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I find that implementation of a state policy prohibiting or restricting the use of seniority as a
factor in teacher layoff decisions increases, on average, the yearly growth of the graduation rate by
about 0.2 percentage points. After urbanicity and region indicators are included, this result is very
consistent across covariate specification. It varies by no more than 0.075 percentage points within
either the 8-year or the 10-year window. (Results range from 0.165 to 0.236 under the 10-year
window, and results range from 0.225 to 0.3 under the shorter 8-year period—as long as urbanicity
and region indicators are included.) Estimates of the policy indicator are statistically significant
at less than the 0.01 level.
It is also economically significant, as the average yearly increase in the national graduation rate
for public high school students from 2010-11 to 2015-16 was about 1 percentage point. If the yearly
growth of overall U.S. graduation rates were 0.2 percentage points higher, it would have resulted in
an additional 115,808 graduates between 2011-12 and 2015-16. Lastly, the estimate of 0.2 is within
range of what Bekkerman and Gilpin (2011) find from a $1,000 investment in either improving
teacher quality via offering higher wages (0.2 to 1.1 percentage point increase in the graduation
rate).
These results suggest that, absent using seniority to determine a layoff order, considerations
such as teacher quality may play a larger role. The teachers remaining following layoffs not based
on seniority may be more effective and therefore their schools would experience higher graduation
rates, as opposed to schools that used seniority to determine the layoff order.
In Table 3, which includes two more recent years of data, the effect of policy is consistently
lower than in Table 4. This is reasonable, as graduation rates cannot increase indefinitely; there is a
maximum value. One would also expect that, at higher graduation rates, it becomes more difficult
to keep the same pace of gains in the yearly increase of graduation rates. Therefore, the effect of
prohibiting or restricting seniority as a factor in teacher layoffs would be expected to decline over
longer periods of time when the graduation rate is approaching higher levels.
The only statistically significant estimates that do not have the signs I expected are the per-
centage of children in poverty within the school district boundaries and the percentage of English
language learners at the district. Districts with more English language learners likely also have
higher rates of poverty. It is possible that students with higher academic ability in areas with lower
poverty have a greater selection of alternatives to public school districts (such as charter schools
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or private schools) and select out of public education. This would contribute to lower graduation
rates for public school districts where the poverty level is low. Students in high-poverty areas may
have no alternate options, whether or not they are more able. The model would then find a positive
relationship between the poverty rate and public school graduation rate.
6. Robustness Checks
6.1 Linearity of the Impact of Policy
As a check for functional form, a plot of residuals on policy would not be informative since policy
is a binary variable. However, the plot of residuals on fitted values in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 do not
show evidence against the linear form used for the policy variable; the range of residual values are
relatively consistent over the fitted values.
Fig. 4. Residuals of on fitted values, using Model 5 of Table 3 (2006-07 to 2015-16).
Fig. 5. Residuals on fitted values, using Model 6 of Table 4 (2006-07 to 2013-14).
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6.2 Results Including Texas
As discussed under the Data section, Texas is omitted from all prior models. It is the only state that
has the policy limiting seniority for the entire time period covered and represents nearly ten percent
of the observations in this compiled data set of public school districts. The average graduation rate
in Texas is over 90% by 2011-12, so additional yearly increases would be more difficult to achieve.
The data does show that the yearly gains in Texas’ average graduation rates are smaller in the latter
years. Therefore, including Texas would drive and bias the effect of the policy variable downward.
Below are two regressions that include Texas. Model (1) below uses the same control set and years
as Table 3, model (5). Model (2) below uses the same control set and years as Table 4, model (6).
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Table 5: Coefficient Estimates for Graduation Rate Changes, Including Texas
(1) (2)
2006-07 to 2015-16 2006-07 to 2013-14
Policy 0.0144 0.0531
(0.0588) (0.0741)
% Special Education -1.440 -1.441
(0.901) (1.064)
% ELL 0.968∗ 1.238
(0.492) (0.642)
% Poverty 3.696∗∗∗ 3.372∗∗∗
(0.385) (0.471)
Surplus per 1,000 Students 0.0167
(0.0216)
Constant -0.0435 0.151
(0.224) (0.290)
Urbanicity Dummies Yes Yes
Region Dummies Yes Yes
Membership/Cohort Controls Yes Yes
N 26923 21563
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Policy is a variable that indicates whether a state has legislation prohibiting or restricting
the influence of seniority on teacher layoff order in effect in a given school year. I constructed this
variable using legislation information from each state. Linear and quadratic terms are included
for both student membership and graduating cohort size. Standard errors are clustered by dis-
trict. District-level graduating cohort sizes of less than 100 are omitted, as are districts where the
standard deviation of graduation rate changes exceeds 30. Surplus per 1,000 students is a fiscal
measurement of district financial health, adjusted to real 2018 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Figures for total expenditure and total revenue, the
number of students receiving special education services, the number of English language learners,
the urbanicity indicator, student membership, graduating cohort size, and graduation rates are are
all obtained from the U.S. National Center from Education Statistics. The percentage of children
in poverty per school district boundary is from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and
Poverty Estimates. State groupings by region are aligned with the U.S. Census Bureau’s definition.
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6.3 Addressing the Standard Deviation of Changes in Graduation Rates
After calculating the yearly change in graduation rates per school district, I noticed a few that were
larger than 90 percentage points. Especially where the district does not have a small cohort size,
this is a highly suspect change. In such cases, there appears to be a data entry error. For example,
a district reports over 90% graduation rate in all ten years except one, where it reports 0.9%. This
clearly is an error and so I do not want to include such data in the regressions. In order to address
this problem, I calculate the standard deviation in district graduation rate changes and exclude
any districts that did not have a standard deviation less than 30. At this threshold, fluctuations
in the graduation rate were not as extreme and appeared to be reasonable. This determination,
however, does not have a large quantitative bearing on the regression results. Below in Table 6,
model 3 is a repeat of Table 3, model 5. Then the other models below vary only in the standard
deviation cutoff.
Table 6: Coefficient Estimates for Graduation Rate Changes, 2006-07 to 2015-16
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any SD SD < 40 SD < 30 SD < 20
Policy 0.204∗ 0.173∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.162∗∗
(0.0808) (0.0646) (0.0633) (0.0625)
N 24818 24675 24578 24475
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Model 3 is a reproduction of model 5 from Table 3. Other models here only adjust the
threshold for standard deviation in district graduation rate changes. See Table 3 for additional
notes.
7. Conclusion
Many states, under various political party compositions, have since 2009 passed legislation pro-
hibiting or restricting teacher seniority as a factor in public school layoffs. Overall, results in this
paper show a positive, persistent effect of this policy on graduation rates. It considers data for
school years 2006-07 through 2015-16, and accounts for such state legislation changes during this
time period. After urbanicity and region indicators are included, this result is very consistent
across covariate specification. When I utilize all ten years of data, I find that this policy on av-
erage increases the yearly growth of the graduation rate by 0.165 to 0.236 percentage points, all
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else held equal. Adding district-level fiscal surplus to the model (thereby restricting the dataset
to the eight-year period through 2013-14 only), the average increase in the yearly growth of the
graduation rate is higher (0.225 to 0.3). This is consistent with the presumption that, at higher
graduation rates, additional increases are more difficult to achieve. Especially as graduation rates
approach and exceed 90%, I would expect the annual increases to dampen over time.
These estimates overlap with the range of what Bekkerman and Gilpin (2011) find from a $1,000
investment in either improving teacher quality via offering higher wages (0.2 to 1.1 percentage point
increase in the graduation rate). These estimates are economically significant, as the average yearly
increase in the national graduation rate for public high school students from 2010-11 to 2015-16 was
about 1 percentage point. If the yearly growth of overall U.S. graduation rates were 0.2 percentage
points higher, it would have resulted in an additional 115,808 graduates between 2011-12 and 2015-
16. All estimates of the policy indicator variable are also statistically significant at less than the
0.01 level.
These results suggest that, absent using seniority to determine a layoff order, considerations
such as teacher quality may play a larger role. The teachers remaining following layoffs not based
on seniority may be more effective and therefore their schools would experience higher graduation
rates, as opposed to schools that used seniority to determine the layoff order.
However, as Boyd et al. (2011) notes, the exact makeup of factors considered is important: the
distribution of importance placed on factors such as principal evaluations, teacher quality (VAM)
and teacher credentials may still impact the layoff order or result in unintended consequences for
student outcomes. For example, the labor market for teachers may responds differently to how
a state or district determines layoff orders. Greater importance placed on value-added measures
could result in more teachers “teaching to the test” and not necessarily improving student out-
comes beyond test scores. Hanushek and Rivkin (2012) note that how to optimally quantify the
characteristics that exhibit changes in a teacher’s effectiveness is unknown, so I would expect a
large degree of subjectivity and possible incentive distortion.
A compelling analysis in Rothstein (2015) reinforces the concern for how the act of implementing
something like VAM for hiring or retention can have significant consequences on the labor market.
It is optimistic that the benefits to students and society can outweigh the costs (such as offering
higher pay since the job is now more risky), but suspects that other research has overstated the
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net gains.
Districts continue to experience mass layoffs and debate what the optimal policy is. It has not
only been a contentious topic among legislatures; the issue has been brought to and continues in
state courts as well. The initial analysis in this paper suggests that the effects may be significant
enough to warrant this debate.
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